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**Policy laboratories of the federal state? : the role of intergovernmental
cooperation in health policy diffusion in Switzerland**

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Katharina Füglister

Policy Laboratories of the Federal State?

The Role of Intergovernmental Cooperation in
Health Policy Diffusion in Switzerland



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